Avalanche Accident Report         

Forest Service Utah Avalanche Center 

 

Sunday, December 14, 2008 

 

Voodoo Wall, Canyons Backcountry – One member of a Five person ski touring party triggered slide, carried through trees, survived with serious injury.

Accident Investigation & Report by Grant Helgeson and Drew Hardesty
Edited & compiled by Brett Kobernik

 

Location:

The avalanche was triggered just above Wall of Voodoo, skiers right of “Squaretop,” (SQ.T) a popular N facing slope near The Canyons ski area.  The avalanche was triggered midslope by the victim, about 9,400’.  The slope terminates at Red Pine lake, just outside of The Canyons ski area.  See the aerial view.   

 

Terrain, Accident and Rescue Summary:  (Click HERE for photos)

A party of 5 expert skiers left the Canyons ski area just before noon.  As there were no backcountry gates open at the time, the group “ducked the rope,” to leave the resort.  The group warmed up with a few laps on “The driveway” an E-NE facing backcountry ski run.  One member of the group assessed the snow with a few hand-pits while lapping this slope.  After tracking up the driveway, the party debated exploring more terrain versus calling it a day.  It was suggested that the party explore the terrain around SQ.T.  The group then toured around the SW side of SQ.T, eventually gaining the ridge that flanks SQ.T to the skiers right.  The ridge runs NE before petering out next to Red Pine lake.  The group discussed descending the ridge down to the summer road that borders Red Pine lake.  Staying on the ridge was the “safest” way to descend.  The first skier went down the ridge and then went skiers left into the NE facing slope just below the “Wall of Voodoo.”  The second skier dropped just left of the first skiers track, enticed by a beautiful, untracked & steep slope.  This deviation from the plan nearly cost the young man his life.

 

The three remaining skiers on the ridge saw the avalanche break behind the second skier.  One member commented that he saw the slab flow up and over the stock wall.  The three skiers on the ridge began shouting and were getting a garbled response from below.  One of the skiers on the ridge instructed everyone to switch their beacons to receive and immediately began descending the slide path.  It was immediately apparent that the avalanche had carried the victim through a stand of rugged alpine pine.

 

The first skier was not caught in the slide, and was already attempting to free the victim when the skiers who had been on the ridge arrived at the victims location.  The victim was wrapped abdomen first around a tree, another tree pinning his back in place.  Blood was present, and it was clear that the victim had sustained serious trauma during the avalanche.

 

While the group made a serious lapse in judgment skiing the slope, they did execute a great rescue.  The tree pinning the victim was removed, as was the snow surrounding his torso.  Next they constructed a makeshift stretcher and alerted emergency response teams via cell phone to their predicament.  The emergency teams informed the group that they would need to get the victim down to Red Pine lake to meet outside help.  One member of the group broke trail while the other three did their best to support & move the victim.  The party lowered the victim some 200 vertical feet to the lake where they met Canyons ski patrol who then took control of the situation and loaded the victim & group into the waiting snowcat.  When the snowcat reached a suitable heli landing location, the victim was loaded into the medical helicopter and flown to the local hospital.  He arrived at the hospital hypothermic with a broken pelvis, vertebrae as well as other injuries.

 

The Utah Avalanche Center had rated the danger as “MODERATE” for terrain above 8,000’, meaning that human triggered avalanches are possible.  The forecaster commented that he’d be “surprised if we don't hear about any (avalanche activity) after the day is done.”

 

Avalanche Data: 

The avalanche is classified as: SS-ASu-R2D2-O

 

Meaning it was a soft slab, skier triggered size 2 avalanche (could bury injure or kill a person), that ran to the middle of the runout zone, and failed in old snow.  The slope inclination at the crown was 42 degrees & N-NE facing.  The slide was approximately 60’ wide and ran 400’ down the slope.  The crown averaged 20” in height.  The slab broke below an ice lens in large grain facets.  The 2.5 mm facets were not cohesive, but, behaved as a soft slab none the less.

 

The avalanche occurred in complex terrain where a slight deviation from the ridge can spell disaster.  The Park City ridgeline is notorious for weak snow and has been the sight of numerous fatalities. 

 

Weather and Avalanche History:  (Click HERE for a snowpit profile)

The Park City mountains reported 11"/.81" of new snow Friday night (Dec 12th to Dec 13th) into Saturday, but not before the range was pummeled by 40-50mph prefrontal winds Friday night.  This easily drove the snow stability to the tipping point, as evidenced by two other slides triggered into similar layering the day before, just south along the ridgeline in an area called West Monitor.  Temperatures were in the single digits, post frontal, and winds were generally from the west in the low to moderate range.  Clearly, the new snow and wind easily overwhelmed the fragile, thin snowpack. 

 

Comments:

The group was composed of 5 expert skiers.  Avalanche skills/education among the group ranged from a former ski patroller to no formal avalanche education with most of the group having attended a level 1 class.  Unfortunately, only one member of the group had read the avalanche forecast in its entirety.  Had the group known of the nearby large avalanches the day before the accident, would they have still skied the slope?  It’s tough to say.

 

It’s always easy to see what went wrong in hindsight, and this accident is no exception.  Most of the group had skied this terrain before, falling into the Familiarity trap.  Before descending the ridge, the group had committed to the idea of not turning back aka, the Commitment heuristic.  It’s likely that there was some Social Facilitation at play as two members of the group had more backcountry experience than the other three.  One member of the group states that he did not feel good about the decision making going on, but, fell victim to the Expert Halo heuristic and didn’t voice his concerns.  I invite anyone interested in these Heuristic Traps to check out Ian McCammon’s work in the area.  All the snow science training in the world will not keep you out of avalanches when these powerful heuristic forces are at work.  This was an expensive lesson for the 4 men and one woman involved, especially the victim who remains in the hospital with numerous serious injuries.